Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance
Pieter Gautier (),
Arjen Siegmann () and
Aico van Vuuren ()
No 692, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
Do higher real-estate agent fees imply better performance? This study uses a nation-wide dataset of residential real-estate transactions in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2011 to provide evidence against this. Brokers with a flat-fee structure who charge an up-front fee (which is substantially lower than the average fee of traditional brokers) and leave the viewings to the seller sell faster and at - on average - 2.7 percent higher prices. We correct for fixed house- and time effects. We provide additional evidence that the price difference is not due to a seller-selection effect.
Keywords: real-estate brokers; broker incentives; housing; agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 L10 L80 R20 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Working Paper: Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance (2018)
Working Paper: Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0692
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