Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance
Pieter Gautier (),
Arjen Siegmann () and
Aico van Vuuren ()
No 17-049/VI, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
Do higher real-estate agent fees imply better performance? This study uses a nation-wide data set of residential real-estate transactions in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2011 to provide evidence against this. Brokers with a flat-fee structure who charge an up-front fee (which is substantially lower than the average fee of traditional brokers) and leave the viewings to the seller sell faster and at - on average - 2.7 percent higher prices. We correct for fixed house- and time effects. We provide additional evidence that the price dfference is not due to a seller-selection effect.
Keywords: real-estate brokers; broker incentives; housing; agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 L10 L80 R20 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance (2018)
Working Paper: Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170049
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