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Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance

Pieter Gautier (), Arjen Siegmann () and Aico van Vuuren ()

No 12587, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Do higher real-estate agent fees imply better performance? This study uses a nation-wide data set of residential real-estate transactions in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2011 to provide evidence against this. Brokers with a flat fee structure who charge an up-front fee (which is substantially lower than the average fee of traditional brokers) and leave the viewings to the seller sell faster and at -on average- 2.7 percent higher prices. We correct for fixed house- and time effects. We provide additional evidence that sellers who chose for a flat fee broker were the ones who benefitted most from them.

Keywords: agency; broker incentives; Housing; real-estate brokers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 L10 L80 R20 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-ure
Date: 2018-01
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