Purely Procedural Preferences - Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity
Werner Güth () and
Topi Miettinen ()
No 3, SITE Working Paper Series from Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
Keywords: procedural preferences; experiment; procedural fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2009-08-13, Revised 2014-10-21
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Journal Article: Purely procedural preferences - Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity (2019)
Working Paper: Purely Procedural Preferences - Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hasite:0003
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