The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
Tore Ellingsen ()
No 61, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics
The paper examines the evolutionary foundations of bilateral bargaining behavior, emphasizing the trade-off between commitment and flexibility. When the pie's size is certain, evolution favors the "fair" strategy; accept any share greater than or equal to one half, reject any smaller share. The unique outcome is hence an equal split. In noisy environments, more flexible behavior tends to appear in equilibrium. Since flexibility attracts greediness, there is then a positive probability of conflict.
Keywords: Bargaining; evolution; commitment; Coase Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, pages 581-602.
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Journal Article: The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0061
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