Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

Geir Asheim

Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame-perfectness. Such refinement is offred through an analysis based on Greenberg's "theory of social situations". A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one-person planning as a problem of individual time-consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a problem of colective time-consistency are captured through the same general concept.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; OPTIMISTIC STABILITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Journal Article: Individual and Collective Time-Consistency (1997)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time-Consistency (1995)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_020

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