Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

Geir Asheim

No 1128, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame-perfectness. Such a refinement is offered through an analysis based on Greenberg's 'theory of social situations'. A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one-person planning as a problem of individual time-consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a problem of collective time-consistency are captured through the same general concept.

Date: 1995-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: Individual and Collective Time-Consistency (1997)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time-Consistency (1996)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
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