Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

Geir Asheim

The Review of Economic Studies, 1997, vol. 64, issue 3, 427-443

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame-perfectness. Such a refinement is offered through an analysis based on Greenberg's "theory of social situations". The properties of this refinement are investigated and illustrated. A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one-person planning as a problem of individual time-consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a problem of collective time-consistency are captured through the same general concept.

Date: 1997
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Related works:
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time-Consistency (1996)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time-Consistency (1995)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
Working Paper: Individual and Collective Time Consistency (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:64:y:1997:i:3:p:427-443.

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