Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Susanne Ek and Bertil Holmlund ()

No 2010:1, Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we develop an equilibrium search and matching model where two-person families as well as singles participate in the labor market. We show that equilibrium entails wage dispersion among equally productive risk-averse workers. Marital status as well as spousal labor market status matters for wage outcomes. In general, employed members of two-person families receive higher wages than employed singles. The model is applied to a welfare analysis of alternative unemployment insurance systems, while recognizing the role of spousal employment as a partial substitute for public insurance. The optimal system involves benefit differentiation based on marital status as well as spousal labor market status

Keywords: Job search; wage bargaining; wage differentials; unemployment; unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2010-04-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ias, nep-lab and nep-ltv
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargainings, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
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