Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Susanne Ek and Bertil Holmlund ()

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2010, vol. 10, issue 1, 27

Abstract: In this paper we develop an equilibrium search and matching model where two-person families as well as singles participate in the labor market. We show that equilibrium entails wage dispersion among equally productive risk-averse workers. Marital status as well as spousal labor market status matters for wage outcomes. In general, employed members of two-person families receive higher wages than employed singles. The model is applied to a welfare analysis of alternative unemployment insurance systems, recognizing the role of spousal employment as a partial substitute for public insurance. The optimal system involves benefit differentiation based on marital status as well as spousal labor market status.

Keywords: wage bargaining; wage differentials; unemployment; unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargainings, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2501

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