Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance

and Bertil Holmlund, Susanne Ek ()
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and Bertil Holmlund, Susanne Ek: Department of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bertil Holmlund () and Susanne Ek

No 2010:2, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper develops an equilibrium search and matching model where two-person families as well as singles participate in the labor market. We show that equilibrium entails wage dispersion among equally productive risk-averse workers. Marital status as well as spousal labor market status matter for wage outcomes. In general, employed members of two-person families receive higher wages than employed singles. The model is applied to a welfare analysis of alternative unemployment insurance systems, recognizing the role of spousal employment as partial substitute for public insurance. The optimal system involves benefit differentiation based on marital status as wellas spousal labor market status. Optimal differentiation yields small welfare gains but gives rise to large wage differentials.

Keywords: Job search; wage bargaining; wage differentials; unemployment; unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2010-01-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ias and nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:288112/FULLTEXT01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargainings, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
Working Paper: Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2010)
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