LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN RUSSIA

Svetlana Avdasheva () and Polina Kryuchkova

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: Law enforcement by regulatory authorities on complaints may replicate not only advantages but also disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement there are strong incentives to open investigations on almost every complaint. The increasing number of complaints and investigations decreases both the resources available per investigation and the standards of proof. It also distorts the structure of enforcement, increases the probability of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals, and lowers deterrence. Statistics of antitrust enforcement in the Russian Federation, including Russian regions, highlight the importance of complaints for making decisions on whether to open investigations and the positive dependence of convictions on the number of investigations

Keywords: antitrust; Russia; public enforcement; complaints; legal errors. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-com, nep-cwa, nep-hme, nep-law and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in WP BRP Series: Public Administration / PA, October 2013, pages 1-35

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:05/pa/2013

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