Finding Good Managers: An Econometric Case Study of a Large Japanese Auto Dealership

Hideo Owan, Shingo Takahashi, Tsuyoshi Tsuru and Katsuhito Uehara

No 609, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: Using the personnel and transaction data from a large auto dealership in Japan, this paper discusses the value, incentives, assignments, determinants of performance, and learning of managers. We find that: (1) moving one standard deviation up the distribution of manager fixed effects raises a branch’s profit by 9.3%; (2) the relationship between managers’ branch assignments and their performance is more consistent with tournament theory rather than screening or learning mechanism; (3) better managers are systematically selected to run less profitable branches; and (4) managers with smaller age difference with subordinates and broader experience tend to perform better.

Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/26744/DP609.pdf

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Working Paper: Finding good managers: an econometric case study of a large Japanese auto dealership (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:609

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