Finding good managers: an econometric case study of a large Japanese auto dealership
Hideo Owan (),
Tsuyoshi Tsuru () and
Katsuhito Uehara ()
Additional contact information
Tsuyoshi Tsuru: Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/English/
Katsuhito Uehara: Faculty of Human Studies, Tenri University, http://www.tenri-u.ac.jp/en/ariirh000000050n.html
No EMS_2014_08, Working Papers from Research Institute, International University of Japan
Using the personnel and transaction data from a large auto dealership in Japan, this paper discusses the value, incentives, assignments, determinants of performance, and learning of managers. We find that: (1) moving one standard deviation up the distribution of manager fixed effects raises a branch's profit by 9.3%; (2) the relationship between managers' branch assignments and their performance is more consistent with tournament theory rather than screening or learning mechanism; (3) better managers are systematically selected to run less profitable branches; and (4) managers with smaller age difference with subordinates and broader experience tend to perform better.
Pages: 43 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
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https://www.iuj.ac.jp/workingpapers/index.cfm?File=EMS_2014_08.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Finding Good Managers: An Econometric Case Study of a Large Japanese Auto Dealership (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iuj:wpaper:ems_2014_08
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