Benefit Morale and Cross-Country Diversity in Sick Pay Entitlements
No 201211, IAAEU Discussion Papers from Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
This paper analyzes the impact of a country’s level of benefit morale on generosity of sick pay entitlements by means of a political economy model and an empirical investigation. Higher benefit morale reduces the incidence of absence. On the one hand, this makes insurance cheaper with the usual demand side reaction. On the other hand, being absent less often, the voter prefers less insurance. The former effect dominates at lower, the latter at higher levels of benefit morale. We present empirical evidence for both effects in a sample of 31 countries between 1981 and 2010.
Keywords: sick pay insurance; political economy; work absence; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H53 P16 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iaaeg.de/images/DiscussionPaper/2012_11.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Benefit Morale and Cross-Country Diversity in Sick Pay Entitlements (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iaa:dpaper:201211
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IAAEU Discussion Papers from Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adrian Chadi ().