Workers' Participation in Wage Setting and Opportunistic Behavior: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment

Jörg Franke, Ruslan Gurtoviy () and Vanessa Mertins
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Ruslan Gurtoviy: University of Trier

No 201407, IAAEU Discussion Papers from Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)

Abstract: Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified giftexchange game where the degree of workers' involvement in the wage setting process is systematically varied among the workers. The experimental data reveals that workers' participation leads actually to a decline in effort exertion which can be explained by negative reciprocity of the respective worker. These results put some recently observed positive effects from workers' participation in experimental labor markets into perspective and are more in line with the ambiguous results from empirical studies.

Keywords: participation; labor market; gift-exchange game; personnel economics; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 J33 L23 M52 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iaa:dpaper:201407

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