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Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies

Pierpaolo Battigalli (), Gabriele Beneduci and Pietro Tebaldi

No 602, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: We extend the epistemic analysis of dynamic games of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999, 2002, 2007) from finite dynamic games to all simple games, that is, fi nite and infi nite-horizon games with finite action sets at non-terminal stages and compact action sets at terminal stages. We prove a generalization of Lubins (1974) extension result to deal with conditional probability systems and strong belief. With this, we can provide a short proof of the following result: in every simple dynamic game, strong rationalizability characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality and common strong belief in rationality. Keywords: Epistemic game theory, simple in finite dynamic game, strong belief, strong rationalizability.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies (2019) Downloads
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