Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies

Pierpaolo Battigalli () and Pietro Tebaldi

Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 68, issue 3, No 8, 737-763

Abstract: Abstract We extend the epistemic analysis of dynamic games of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (J Econ Theory 88:188–230, 1999, J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002, Res Econ 61:165–184, 2007) from finite dynamic games to all simple games, that is, finite and infinite-horizon multistage games with finite action sets at nonterminal stages and compact action sets at terminal stages. We prove a generalization of Lubin’s (Proc Am Math Soc 43:118–122, 1974) extension result to deal with conditional probability systems and strong belief. With this, we can provide a short proof of the following result: in every simple dynamic game, strong rationalizability characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality and common strong belief in rationality.

Keywords: Epistemic game theory; Simple infinite dynamic game; Strong belief; Strong rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-018-1142-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:68:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1142-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1142-8

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().