Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions
Alberto Alesina and
Roberto Perotti
No 1996/052, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund
Abstract:
By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. We critically assess theoretical contributions in this area and suggest several open and unresolved issue. We also examine the empirical evidence drawn from studies on samples of OECD countries, Latin American countries and the United States. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of this literature and with some concrete proposals.
Keywords: WP; budget procedure; budget institution; GNP ratio; government negotiations; line item; spending minister; government fragmentation; government proposal; government fragility; power of the executive; pork barrel; government preparation; Budget planning and preparation; Government debt management; Fiscal consolidation; Fiscal law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 1996-05-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (105)
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Chapter: Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions (1999) 
Working Paper: Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions (1996) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1996/052
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