Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions
Alberto Alesina and
Roberto Perotti ()
No 5556, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. We critically assess theoretical contributions in this area and suggest several open and unresolved issues. We also examine the empirical evidence drawn from studies on samples of OECD countries, Latin American countries and US states.
Date: 1996-05
Note: ME
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Published as Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance. Poterba, James M., and Jurgenvon Hagen, eds., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999,pp. 13-36.
Published as Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions , Alberto F. Alesina, Roberto Perotti. in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance , Poterba and von Hagen. 1999
Published as Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," IMF Working Papers, vol 96(52).
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Chapter: Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions (1999) 
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