Gender pairing and bargaining - Beware the same sex!

Matthias Sutter, Ronald Bosman (), Martin Kocher and Frans van Winden ()

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck

Abstract: We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party's gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.

Keywords: gender pairing; bargaining; psychology; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-ltv
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex! (2009)
Working Paper: Gender pairing and bargaining-Beware the same sex! (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2008-27

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