Strategic sophistication of adolescents ? Evidence from experimental normal-form games
Simon Czermak (),
Francesco Feri (),
Daniela Glätzle-Rützler () and
Matthias Sutter ()
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
We examine the strategic sophistication of adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides making choices, subjects have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that choices are more often a best reply to beliefs if any player has a dominant strategy and equilibrium payoffs are not too unequal. Using a mixture model we can estimate for each subject the probability to be any of eight different strategic and non-strategic types. The econometric estimation reveals that older subjects are more likely to eliminate dominated strategies, and that subjects with good math grades are more strategic.
Keywords: Strategic thinking; beliefs; experiment; age; adolescents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Strategic Sophistication of Adolescents: Evidence from Experimental Normal-Form Games (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2010-15
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Janette Walde ().