Strategic Sophistication of Adolescents: Evidence from Experimental Normal-Form Games

Simon Czermak (), Francesco Feri, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler and Matthias Sutter
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Simon Czermak: University of Innsbruck

No 5049, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We examine the strategic sophistication of adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides making choices, subjects have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that choices are more often a best reply to beliefs if any player has a dominant strategy and equilibrium payoffs are not too unequal. Using a mixture model we can estimate for each subject the probability to be any of eight different strategic and non-strategic types. The econometric estimation reveals that older subjects are more likely to eliminate dominated strategies, and that subjects with good math grades are more strategic.

Keywords: strategic thinking; beliefs; experiment; age; adolescents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2010-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2016, 128, 265-285.

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Working Paper: Strategic sophistication of adolescents - Evidence from experimental normal-form games (2010)
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