EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Endogenous Scheduling Preferences and Congestion

Mogens Fosgerau and Kenneth Small ()

No 131403, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: We seek to better understand the scheduling of activities in time through a dynamic model of commuting with congestion, in which workers care solely about leisure and consumption. Implicit preferences for the timing of the commute form endogenously due to concave preferences and temporal agglomeration economies. Equilibrium exists uniquely and is indistinguishable from that of a generalized version of the classical Vickrey bottleneck model, based on exogenous trip-timing preferences; but optimal policies differ: the Vickrey model will under-predict the benefits of congestion pricing, and such pricing may make people better off even without considering the use of revenues.

Keywords: Urban congestion; Agglomeration; Endogenous preferences; scheduling preferences; Bottleneck (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2013-01, Revised 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tre and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2013-14/13-14-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: ENDOGENOUS SCHEDULING PREFERENCES AND CONGESTION (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:131403

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Melissa Valdez ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:131403