Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries
Keith Evans () and
Quinn Weninger ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
We present a dynamic game of search and learning about the productivity of com-peting fishing locations. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are com-pared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full valueof information, and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces afree-riding problem, as each coop member prefers that other members undertake costlysearch for information. Pooling contracts among coop members may mitigate, butare not likely to eliminate free riding. Our results explain the paucity of informationsharing in fisheries and suggest regulators use caution in advocating cooperatives as asolution to common pool inefficiencies in fisheries.
Keywords: search; Information sharing; Dynamic Bayesian game; Fishing cooperative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-reg
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Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economics
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Journal Article: Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries (2014)
Working Paper: Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:31606
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