Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries

Keith Evans and Quinn Weninger ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2014, vol. 58, issue 3, 353-372

Abstract: We present a dynamic game of search and learning about the productivity of competing fishing locations. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information, and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem, as each coop member prefers that other members undertake costly search for information. Pooling contracts among coop members may mitigate, but are not likely to eliminate free-riding. Our results explain the paucity of information sharing in fisheries and suggest regulators use caution in advocating cooperatives as a solution to common pool inefficiencies in fisheries. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Keywords: Search; Information sharing; Bayesian learning; Fisheries cooperatives; Q22; D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries (2014)
Working Paper: Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries (2011)
Working Paper: Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9701-8

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