Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries

Keith S. Evans and Quinn Weninger ()

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a dynamic game of search and learning by fishermen who seek the true location of a partially observable fish stock. Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem as each member prefers another undertake costly search for information. Contractual agreements among coop members may mitigate, but not likely eliminate free-riding. Our results explain why information sharing is rare in fisheries and offer guidance for improving fishery management.

Date: 2011-12-26
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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries (2014)
Working Paper: Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries (2014)
Working Paper: Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries (2010)
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