A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Oscar Volij (), Nir Dagan () and Eyal Winter ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Date: 2002-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare 2002, vol. 19, pp. 811-823

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Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2001)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2000)
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