A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution
Nir Dagan (),
Oscar Volij () and
Eyal Winter ()
Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij
We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.
Keywords: bargaining; Nash bargaining solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 811-823, (2002).
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Journal Article: A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution (2002)
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Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ovolij:013
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