A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Nir Dagan (), Oscar Volij () and Eyal Winter ()

Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij

Abstract: We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Keywords: bargaining; Nash bargaining solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01-09
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 811-823, (2002).

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Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2000)
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