A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution
Nir Dagan (),
Oscar Volij () and
Eyal Winter ()
Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan
We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.
Keywords: bargaining problem; Nash solution; axiomatic characterization; Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives; Twisting; Disagreement Point Convexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-08-31, Revised 2000-09-21
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare 19:811-823 (2002)
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Journal Article: A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:018
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