A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Nir Dagan (nir@nirdagan.com), Oscar Volij (oscar@volij.co.il) and Eyal Winter (mseyal@pluto.huji.ac.il)

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Keywords: bargaining problem; Nash solution; axiomatic characterization; Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives; Twisting; Disagreement Point Convexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2000-08-31, Revised 2000-09-21
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare 19:811-823 (2002)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2002)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:018

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