Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics
Robert Dur () and
Max van Lent ()
Additional contact information
Max van Lent: Leiden University
No 11095, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
We develop a model where people differ in their altruistic preferences and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making donations to charity and by taking a public service job and exerting effort on the job. Our theory predicts that people who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job, make higher donations to charity. Comparing equally altruistic workers, those with a regular job make higher donations to charity than those with a public service job by a simple substitution argument. We subsequently test these predictions using cross-sectional data from Germany on self-reported altruism, sector of employment, and donations to charity. In addition, we use panel data from the Netherlands on volunteering and sector of employment. We find support for most of our predictions.
Keywords: altruism; charitable donations; volunteering; public service motivation; public sector employment; self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 H11 J45 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published in: Labour Economics, 2018, 51, 13-24..
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Serving the public interest in several ways: Theory and empirics (2018)
Working Paper: Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics (2017)
Working Paper: Serving the Public Interest in Several Ways: Theory and Empirics (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11095
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().