Long-Run Consequences of Health Insurance Promotion: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ghana
Patrick Asuming (),
Hyuncheol Bryant Kim () and
Armand Sim ()
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Armand Sim: Cornell University
No 11117, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
We study the long-run impacts of health insurance promotion in Northern Ghana. We randomly provide three overlapping interventions to promote enrollment: subsidy, information campaign, and convenient sign-up option, with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. Our interventions, especially the subsidy, promote enrollment and healthcare service utilization in the short and long runs. We also find short-run health status improvements, which disappear in the long run. We find suggestive evidence on decreased investment in disease prevention and selection that may help explain this pattern of health status changes.
Keywords: health insurance; sustainability; moral hazard; selection; screening effect; randomized experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I1 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-mfd
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11117
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