Deadlines and Cognitive Limitations

Steffen Altmann, Christian Traxler and Philipp Weinschenk ()
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Philipp Weinschenk: University of Kaiserslautern

No 11129, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper studies the interplay between deadlines and cognitive limitations. We analyze an agent's decision to complete a one-off task under a deadline. Postponing the task can be beneficial for the agent; missing the deadline, however, leads to a drop in the agent's rewards. If the agent exhibits cognitive limitations, postponing increases the risk of becoming inattentive and failing to complete the task in time. Our framework provides a rich set of predictions on the behavioral implications of deadlines. We test these predictions in a field experiment at a dental clinic, in which we exogenously vary deadlines and rewards for arranging check-up appointments. The empirical results underline the behavioral relevance of cognitive limitations. Imposing relatively tight deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. Evidence from a follow-up experiment and complementary surveys supports the notion that deadlines may serve as a powerful instrument when individuals' cognitive capacity is limited.

Keywords: deadlines; cognitive limitations; limited memory; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D03 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - substantially revised version published in: Management Science , 2022, 68 (9), 6733-6750

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Working Paper: Deadlines and Cognitive Limitations (2017)
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