Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Alice Solda and Marie Claire Villeval

No 11227, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Using a negatively framed public good game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators although it is not an equilibrium strategy. Exclusion has a positive impact on cooperation when it is followed by a quick rather than a slow reintegration and that the length of exclusion is chosen by the group. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. Post-exclusion cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish.

Keywords: experiment; cooperation; social dilemma; exclusion; reintegration; ostracism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - revised version published in: Economic Inquiry, 2019, 58 (1), 120-149

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp11227.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: EXCLUSION AND REINTEGRATION IN A SOCIAL DILEMMA (2020)
Working Paper: Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma (2020)
Working Paper: Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma (2017)
Working Paper: Exclusion and reintegration in a social dilemna (2017)
Working Paper: Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11227

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().