Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests

Julien Benistant () and Marie Claire Villeval
Additional contact information
Julien Benistant: GATE, University of Lyon

No 12120, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Using a real-effort experiment, we study whether group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We vary whether minimal group identity is induced or not, whether individuals have to report their own outcome or the outcome of their competitor, and whether pairs of competitors share the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreport in the same proportion and to the same extent by inflating their outcome or by decreasing their opponent's outcome, except when any possible scrutiny by the experimenter is removed. Regardless of the possibility of scrutiny by the experimenter, misreporting is affected neither by the competitor's group identity nor by the individual's beliefs about others' misreporting behavior. This suggests that in competitive settings, unethical behavior is mainly driven by an unconditional desire to win.

Keywords: experiment; contests; group identity; sabotage; lying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D63 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Forthcoming - revised version published in: Journal of Economic Psychology, 2019, 72, 128-155

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Related works:
Journal Article: Unethical behavior and group identity in contests (2019)
Working Paper: Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests (2019)
Working Paper: Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests (2017)
Working Paper: Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests (2017)
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