Buy Flexible, Pay More: The Role of Temporary Contracts on Wage Inequality
Andrea Albanese () and
Giovanni Gallo ()
Additional contact information
Giovanni Gallo: INAPP – Institute for Public Policy Analysis
No 13008, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
We investigate the role of temporary contracts in shaping wage inequality in a dual labour market. Based on Italian individual-level administrative data, our analysis focuses on new hires in temporary and open-ended contracts for the period of 2005–2015. To estimate the presence of differentials over the daily wage distribution, we follow Firpo (2007) and implement an inverse probability estimator, which allows us to control for labour market history, including lagged outcomes, over the last 16 years. Our results show the existence of a premium for temporary contracts over the full distribution of daily remuneration at entry, confirming the economic theory of equalizing differences. The wage premium is greater when permanent contracts are more valuable, such as for 'marginalised' categories like female, young, and low-paid temporary workers, and during the years of the economic crisis. The gap remains substantial after taking into account differences in working hours between workers.
Keywords: temporary work; wage inequality; unconditional quantile treatment effect; inverse probability weighting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 C31 J21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Buy flexible, pay more: The role of temporary contracts on wage inequality (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13008
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().