Unions, Tripartite Competition and Innovation

Alex Bryson and Harald Dale-Olsen ()
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Harald Dale-Olsen: Institute for Social Research, Oslo

No 13015, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We present theoretical and empirical evidence challenging results from early studies that found unions were detrimental to workplace innovation. Under our theoretical model, which extends the Cournot duopoly innovation model, local union wage bargaining is more conducive to innovation - particularly product innovation - than competitive pay setting. We test the theory with workplace data for Britain and Norway. Results are consistent with the theory: local union bargaining is positively associated with product innovations in both countries. In Norway, local union bargaining is also positively associated with process innovation.

Keywords: trade unions; process innovation; product innovation; collective bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J28 J51 J81 L23 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com, nep-ino and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published - published in: Research in Labor Economics, 2021, 49, 41-65

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Working Paper: Unions, Tripartite Competition and Innovation (2020)
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