Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods

Jeffrey Carpenter

No 1337, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who punish, we simulate an environment populated with behavioral strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is allowed. We test these hypotheses experimentally and examine whether the effect of group size is purely due to the number of group members or if information about other group members is what is important. We find that large groups contribute at rates no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably in large groups. However, hindrances to monitoring do reduce the provision of the public good.

Keywords: experiment; group size; punishment; public goods; simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published - published in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 60 (1), 31-51

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Related works:
Journal Article: Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods (2007)
Working Paper: Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods (2002)
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