Why Are Jobs Designed the Way They Are?

Cindy Zoghi (), Alec R. Levenson () and Michael Gibbs
Additional contact information
Cindy Zoghi: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Alec R. Levenson: University of Southern California

No 1529, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we study job design. Will an organization plan precisely how the job is to be done ex ante, or ask workers to determine the process as they go? We first model this decision and predict complementarity between these job attributes: multitasking, discretion, skills, and interdependence of tasks. We argue that characteristics of the firm and industry (e.g., product and technology, organizational change) can explain observed patterns and trends in job design. We then use novel data on these job attributes to examine these issues. As predicted, job designs tend to be ‘coherent’ across these characteristics within the same job. Job designs also tend to follow similar patterns across jobs in the same firm, and especially in the same establishment: when one job is optimized ex ante, others are more likely to be also. There is some evidence that firms may segregate different types of job designs across different establishments.

Keywords: job design; organization design; specialization; intrinsic motivation; job enrichment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J2 J24 L23 M5 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published - published in: Research in Labor Economics, 2010, 30, 107-154

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Related works:
Chapter: Why are jobs designed the way they are? (2010)
Working Paper: Why are Jobs Designed the Way They Are? (2008)
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