How Should We Think About Employers' Associations?

Alex Bryson and Paul Willman ()
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Paul Willman: London School of Economics

No 15467, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We maintain that employer associations are a specific form of employer collusion that is overt, formal and labour market focused which encompasses but is by no means confined to collective bargaining. We consider the conditions under which this form of collusion might emerge, and how it might develop. Since the context is the decline of employers’ associations in collective bargaining, we look at how collective bargaining involvement (and its disappearance) might relate to the growth or decline of other forms of collusion in areas such as product and financial markets, and political influence. Our central contention is that employers’ associations continue to perform an important role in helping employers set the terms of trade, albeit one that has adapted to the demise of sectoral bargaining.

Keywords: employers’ associations; collective bargaining; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2024, 62 (2), 193-205

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Related works:
Journal Article: How should we think about employers’ associations? (2024)
Working Paper: How should we think about employers’ associations? (2022)
Working Paper: How Should We Think About Employers’ Associations? (2022)
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