EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?

Jeffrey Carpenter and Peter Matthews

No 1583, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third party punishment is surprisingly thin, however. In this paper, we report on the results of an experiment designed to evaluate two distinct explanations for this phenomenon, indignation and group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene primarily to promote efficiency.

Keywords: voluntary contribution mechanism; norm; third party punishment; reciprocity; experiment; indignation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 C91 C92 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2005-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published - published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2012, 10 (3), 555-572

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp1583.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: NORM ENFORCEMENT: ANGER, INDIGNATION, OR RECIPROCITY? (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity? (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1583

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().

 
Page updated 2024-06-21
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1583