Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments

Peter J. Jost and Matthias Kräkel
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Peter J. Jost: Otto-Beisheim-Hochschule, Koblenz

No 159, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents’ strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.

Keywords: sequential tournaments; rank-order tournaments; Preemptive behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J33 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2000-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Economics of Governance, 2005, 6(3), 245-252

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