Mafias and Firms

Jaime Arellano-Bover, Marco De Simoni (), Luigi Guiso, Rocco Macchiavello, Domenico J. Marchetti () and Mounu Prem
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Marco De Simoni: Bank of Italy
Domenico J. Marchetti: Bank of Italy

No 16893, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Infiltration of the legal economy by criminal organizations (OCGs) is potentially significant, though how pervasive remains uncertain. Beyond the volume, the motives driving infiltration are of serious policy concern. We introduce a conceptual framework to differentiate between OCGs' motives for infiltrating legal firms and validate it using new data from the Italian Financial Intelligence Unit. About 2% of Italian firms appear to have links with OCGs, with three primary motives. Firms established by OCGs are predominantly used for criminal activities (functional motive). Medium-sized firms, often infiltrated post-creation, primarily reflect a competitive motive, wherein criminal activities benefit the firm. Lastly, large, well-established firms remain separate from criminal activities and are used for pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns, such as to establish political connections (pure motive). This so far unnoticed motive accounts for a substantial share of OCGs' infiltration.

Keywords: organized crime; legal economy; firms; infiltration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 K4 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-ltv and nep-sbm
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Related works:
Working Paper: Mafias and Firms (2024)
Working Paper: Mafias and Firms (2024)
Working Paper: Mafias and Firms (2024)
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