The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems

William E. Encinosa , Martin Gaynor and James Rebitzer
Additional contact information
William E. Encinosa : Agency for Health Care Research and Quality

No 1851, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: When working together, people engage in non-contractual and informal interactions that constitute the sociology of the group. We use behavioral models and a unique survey of medical groups to analyze how group sociology influences physician incentive pay and behavior. We conclude that informal interactions among group members influence pay practices and behaviors, but the relationship is complex. No single aspect of group sociology is entirely consistent with all the patterns in the data. Factors emphasized in the economic theory of agency, notably risk aversion, also shape pay policies but these factors cannot account for all the observed empirical relationships.

Keywords: incentives; social norms; physicians (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D22 J40 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2007, 62 (2), 187-214

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp1851.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The sociology of groups and the economics of incentives: Theory and evidence on compensation systems (2007)
Working Paper: The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems (1997)
Working Paper: The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1851

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().