Fact-Checking Politicians

Andrea Mattozzi (), Samuel Nocito () and Francesco Sobbrio ()
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Andrea Mattozzi: University of Bologna
Samuel Nocito: Sapienza University of Rome
Francesco Sobbrio: University of Rome Tor Vergata

No 18534, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: We study how politicians respond to the fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design employs a difference-in-differences approach, complemented by a randomized field intervention conducted in collaboration with a leading fact-checking organization. We find that fact-checking discourages politicians from making factually incorrect statements, with effects lasting several weeks. At the same time, we show that fact-checking neither increases nor displaces correct statements. Politicians who are fact-checked tend to substitute incorrect statements with either no statements or unverifiable ones, suggesting that they may also respond by increasing the "ambiguity" of their language to avoid public scrutiny.

Keywords: fact-checking; politicians; accountability; verifiability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D8 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
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