Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates

John Addison, C. R. Barrett () and William Siebert ()
Additional contact information
C. R. Barrett: University of Birmingham

No 1866, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more "deserving" workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts – separating the various worker types – the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision has the advantage over mandates of preserving separations.

Keywords: compensation packages; labour mandates; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2005-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Portuguese Economic Journal, 2006, 5 (2), 69 - 87

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp1866.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Building blocks in the economics of mandates (2006)
Working Paper: Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1866

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Fallak ().