Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations

Matthias Kräkel

No 2059, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping or cheating within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified which determine a player’s doping decision – a cost effect, a likelihood effect and a windfall-profit effect. Moreover, we discuss whether the favorite or the underdog is more likely to be doped, the impact of doping on overall performance, the influence of increased heterogeneity on doping, the welfare implications of doping, and possible prevention of doping.

Keywords: tournament; fraud in research; doping; contest; cheating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 K42 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: European Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 23 (4), 988-1006

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