Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity

Jeffrey Carpenter, Samuel Bowles () and Herbert Gintis
Additional contact information
Samuel Bowles: Santa Fe Institute

No 2106, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group size or public signals. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity in teams.

Keywords: punishment; team production; public good; monitoring; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 J41 J54 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-pbe, nep-soc and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 71(2), 221-232

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Working Paper: Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity (2006)
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