Punishment, Inequality and Emotions

David Masclet () and Marie Claire Villeval

No 2119, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Cooperation among people who are not related to each other is sustained by the availability of punishment devices which help enforce social norms (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). However, the rationale for costly punishment remains unclear. This paper reports the results of an experiment investigating inequality aversion and negative emotions as possible determinants of punishment. We compare two treatments of a public good game, one in which costly punishment reduces the immediate payoff inequality between the punisher and the target, and one in which it does not affect inequality. We show that while inequality-aversion prevents some subjects from punishing in the equal cost treatment, negative emotions are the primary motive for punishment. Results also indicate that the intensity of punishment increases with the level of inequality, and reduces earnings inequality over time.

Keywords: free-riding; negative emotions; inequality aversion; experiment; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Published - revised version published as 'Punishment, inequality, and welfare : a public good experiment' in: Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 31 (3), 475–502.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006)
Working Paper: Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006)
Working Paper: Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006)
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