Who Pays for Performance?

Erling Barth, Bernt Bratsberg (), Torbjørn Hægeland and Oddbjørn Raaum

No 2142, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Using Norwegian establishment surveys from 1997 and 2003, we show that performance-related pay is more prevalent in firms where workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organize their work. This observation supports an interpretation of incentive pay as motivated by agency problems. Performance-related pay is also more widespread in large firms. Traditionally, wage setting in the Norwegian labor market has been dominated by negotiations between trade unions and employer associations at the central and local levels, with a fixed hourly wage as a predominant element of the wage scheme. Our results show that performance-related pay is less common in highly unionized firms and in firms where wages are determined through centralized bargaining. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this paper reveals that performance pay is on the rise in Norway, even after accounting for changes in industry structure, bargaining regime, and union density. Finally, we find that the incidence of performance-related pay relates positively to product-market competition and foreign ownership.

Keywords: agency problems; performance related pay; compensation methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published - published in: International Journal of Manpower, 2008, 20 (1), 8-29

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